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DELIVERY OF GOODS IN THE CUSTODY OF A THIRD PARTY: THE
ROLE OF THE CUSTODIER
Craig Anderson 1 Nonetheless, delivery still has a role in the law. It is still necessary in cases other than sale, and is also necessary for the creation of a real right of pledge.
In addition, the Sale of Goods Acts have preserved a minor role for delivery in sales of goods.
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Delivery most often happens by the physical handing over of the goods by transferor to transferee. This, though, is not the only way in which delivery can occur.
Delivery, in the technical sense meant here, is a transfer of possession from one person to another. 3 It is no novelty to say that possession may be acquired from another in a number of ways. Not all deliveries take the form of goods being placed by the transferor directly into the transferee's hand. Other possibilities include the delivery of the key to the place in which the goods are kept (the traditio clavium of Roman law). 4 Likewise, delivery may occur in the form known as traditio brevi manu, where the transferee already has custody of the property being transferred, custody being defined here as the physical holding of property, but without the * Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University. I acknowledge the helpful comments of my colleague, David Christie, on a draft of this article, and also of the anonymous reviewers. intention to hold for oneself that is necessary for possession. 5 In such a case, no further act of delivery is required beyond the consent of the parties. 6 Again, delivery may occur by constitutum possessorium, where it is agreed that the transferor will continue to hold custody of the property on a different basis, the transferee then having civil possession through the transferor's acts. We are concerned here with the acquisition of civil possession from another who also had civil possession only. The situation envisaged is that the property is in the custody of a third party -perhaps the keeper of a warehouse 9 -who holds on behalf of the transferor, the intention being that the custodier will instead hold for the transferee. Throughout, the property stays in the custody of this third party. This is a recognised form of delivery, as we shall see. It depends on intimation of the transfer being given to the custodier, normally by means of a delivery order in favour of the transferee and addressed to the custodier. This article looks at the role of the custodier in the process. How do the parties relate to the custodier? What must the parties and the custodier do to effect delivery?
First, a point of terminology must be addressed. There is no name specific to this form of delivery. The term "constructive delivery" is often used for it, but that name extends also to any case of "transmission of title without the necessity of an actual handing over of natural possession to the transferee", 10 thus including also traditio brevi manu and constitutum possessorium. It has also been used for traditio 5 Anderson, Possession (n 3) para 1-13. For example, an employee holding goods in the course of employment has not possession, but custody only, as the employee holds entirely on the employer's behalf rather than for himself or herself. 6 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 622 (Gordon). 7 On the effectiveness of constitutum possessorium as a form of delivery, see Reid, Property (n 6) para 623 (Gordon) clavium. 11 As this article is not concerned with those forms of delivery, a more specific term seems necessary. For this article, therefore, the form of delivery with which we are concerned will be referred to as "delivery by transfer of civil possession".
(2) The assignation theory
In a previous article, this writer considered the nature of this form of delivery. 12 It was seen there that the basis of this form of delivery is unclear. Certainly, it is not universally recognised in systems with a delivery requirement in the transfer of corporeal moveable property. It was proposed in the previous article that transfer of civil possession operates by means of an assignation of the right to enforce the obligations owed by the custodier. The idea is that the transferor's civil possession depends on the obligations owed to him or her by the custodier and that, therefore, if the right to enforce those obligations is transferred to another person then civil possession is also transferred to that person when intimation of the assignation is made to the custodier. 13 This was referred to as the "assignation theory" of transfer of civil possession, and the same term will be used in this article. As we proceed, consideration will be given to whether any further support can be found for the assignation theory.
B. THE ROLE OF THE CUSTODIER
The custodier is an essential participant in the process of delivery by transfer of civil possession. It is, though, easy to see the custodier as simply the passive recipient of intimation. The purpose of this article is to look more closely at the custodier's role in the process, considering both what must be done by the parties to the transfer and also whether any action by the custodier is necessary.
(1) Intimation must be made to the actual custodier 11 Gauld v Middleton 1959 SLT (Sh Ct) 61 at 62, where one of the examples given of constructive delivery is a traditio clavium. 12 C Anderson, "Delivery of goods in the custody of a third party: operation and basis" (2015) 19 Edin LR 165. 13 For discussion of how the intimation is made, see Anderson, Delivery (n 12) at 172-175.
Where the goods to be delivered are in the custody of someone other than transferor and transferee, delivery is effected when intimation of the transfer is made to the custodier. In the standard case of delivery of this kind, the custodier will be someone with whom the transferor has a contractual relationship, in terms of which the custodier is obliged to take care of the goods and hold them on the transferor's behalf.
The suggestion is that delivery of this kind involves assignation, in favour of the transferee, of the transferor's personal right against the custodier. Assignation of a personal right, of course, requires intimation of that assignation to the debtor. The assignation is not effective against the debtor until that is done. Before intimation, the transferor has possession based on this personal right against the custodier. After intimation has been made, the custodier holds on behalf of the transferee instead, giving the transferee possession on the same basis as it was previously held by the transferor.
The assignation theory draws support from the fact that there does not seem to be any decided case in Scotland, concerned with delivery of goods in the custody of a third party, where delivery has been held to have occurred without intimation. 14 The question, though, is to whom intimation must be made. Two situations can be distinguished. The first is the straightforward situation where the transferor has dealt directly with the custodier. The second is where arrangements for the custody of the goods have been made, not by the transferor personally, but by an agent acting on behalf of the transferor. These two situations will be considered separately.
(a) Where the transferor has dealt directly with the custodier. This situation is straightforward in principle. Without exception, it has been held that delivery occurs when intimation has been made to the custodier. The only practical difficulty is determining who the custodier is, where there is more than one person with some level of access to or control over the goods. officer. There was a purported transfer by the issuing of a delivery order and intimation to the revenue officer. The difficulty here is that there were two parties who potentially had custody of the goods. In the event, it was held that there had been no delivery:
The excise officer was not a warehouseman; the goods were in no sense whatever in his custody at any time either as being held by him for Rhind or anybody else.
He has a key of the warehouse where the goods were stored, but that only for the purpose of enabling him to protect the interests of the excise.
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The fact that the goods were actually on the premises of one of the potential custodiers must be influential here. While this is not decisive, it is nonetheless easier to show custody of goods within one's own premises. 23 The practical lesson, though, is that in cases of doubt it is better to intimate to both or all potential custodiers. This poses an obvious problem for the assignation theory of delivery of goods in the custody of a third party, given that the assignation theory is based on the assignation of the transferor's personal right against the custodier. Alternatively, it may be that the view should be taken that a contract made by an undisclosed agent does in fact bind the principal, and thus that the principal (here the transferor) does have a direct legal relationship with the custodier. If this issue should come before the court again, it may be that reconsideration is in order, based on full reflection on the basis of this form of delivery. For practical purposes, though, the lesson is once again this. Where there is doubt as to which one of two parties is the proper person to whom to make intimation, the better course is to make intimation to both. All the same, it may be that the law is overly inflexible here. In a case like M'Ewan v Smith, it would seem natural to deal with the importing agent, who has made arrangements for the storage of the goods, rather than the warehousekeeper, who knows only the importing agent and who may therefore be in no position to accept instructions from any other party with respect to the goods.
Finally, for completeness, it may be noted that agency issues could also arise where an agent acts for the transferee or the custodier. Where the agency is disclosed, no difficulty arises (at least on this ground). Where the custodier acts through a disclosed agent, it would be expected that intimation either to agent or principal would be effective. If the custodier acts through an undisclosed agent, then 28 The Lord President, the Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Medwyn, Wood (who was also the Lord Ordinary), Robertson, Murray, Cockburn and Mackenzie, affirming the opinions of the Sheriff and Lord Ordinary. 29 Notwithstanding the indication to the contrary in the rubric and headnote of the Session Cases report, the majority did not in any way found upon the doctrine of stoppage in transitu (the unpaid seller's right to stop goods while in transit, on the buyer's insolvency, now regulated by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss 44-46). The Lord Ordinary noted that intimation in such a case "deprives the vendor of his right to stop" (439), but he had already founded his opinion on the question of transfer of ownership. Lord Cockburn made only a passing reference to "stopping delivery" (446). Lord Robertson appears to say that stoppage in transitu is irrelevant, as "the goods were never in transitu at all" (445). The only judges who actually base their opinions on this doctrine are those of the minority. presumably, in accordance with the normal position on undisclosed agency, intimation to the agent would be sufficient.
If the transferor was acting through an agent, and if that agency was not disclosed to the transferor, then naturally the transferor would believe that he or she was transferring the goods to the agent, and the form of intimation to the custodier would reflect that. This raises general issues of the effect of a purported conveyance to an undisclosed agent. As this is a general issue, it is beyond the scope of this article, but it may be that the conveyance would operate in favour of the agent rather than the principal, in accordance with the parties' apparent intention. If the agency was only undisclosed to the custodier, on the other hand, it is not clear that any transfer of ownership would occur at all. After all, the transferor's intention would be to convey to the transferee, but (on the assignation theory) the assignation of the right against the custodier would be in favour of the agent. Perhaps in this case that would be sufficient to give possession to the agent, which could then be ascribed to the principal and intended transferee, thus effecting delivery.
(2) Is any action required on the part of the custodier?
Once intimation has been given to the custodier then, certainly in the case of a commercial warehouse, it is likely that the custodier will make a record of the transfer. This is, of course, sensible practice. However, is it required?
If it is correct that this form of delivery is based on assignation of the transferor's personal rights against the custodier, it would seem to follow that no more is required than for assignation generally. In other words, on this basis, intimation to the custodier should be enough to complete the delivery, just as assignation of a debt is completed by intimation without any action being required of the debtor.
However, the view has been expressed that something more is required.
Gordon states that delivery is complete "[o]nce the instructions are accepted". 31 The instructions referred to are the notice to the custodier to hold henceforth for the transferee. The position is thus made to appear rather similar to the English requirement of attornment, which requires the custodier to acknowledge that he holds 31 Reid, Property (n 6) para 620 (Gordon On the face of it, then, there is strong support for the proposition that mere intimation to the custodier is not sufficient for delivery of this kind. Instead, the picture is presented of something being required of the custodier, whatever that something may be. This poses a clear challenge to the assignation theory.
However, examined more closely, the case for this position appears rather weaker. The three cases that Gordon cites for his view do not support it. In the first, in fact, it is expressly said that "the intimation completed the right". 35 In the third, it is stated that delivery is effected by "such intimation of [the transferee's] right to the custodier as will make it the legal duty of the latter to hold the goods for him". 36 Both of these cases, therefore, seem supportive of the assignation theory rather than otherwise. In the only one of the three cases where there is consideration of the idea that the custodier has to do something to effect delivery -in this case, put flour into The record made by the custodier is thus for Bell merely evidence of the transfer; it is not constitutive of the transfer. Hume's view therefore stands as the sole basis for the proposition that something is required of the custodier following intimation, and the argument must fall before the uniformity of the authority in opposition to it. The conclusion must therefore be that intimation is sufficient, and that no action on the part of the custodier is required for this form of delivery.
C. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THE CUSTODIER
If the assignation theory were found to be correct, then certain things would follow from that. Among other things, issues would arise with regard to the nature of the relationship between the parties involved, where those relationships were of a nature that they would pose problems in assignation. The decision was marked, though, by the Lord President's strong dissenting opinion. The Lord President held that, by leaving the goods in the custody of the sellers' storekeeper, the buyers had chosen to trust to the sellers' credit. There was no sign of any basis on which it could be said that the goods were now in the buyers' possession. He also pointed out that, had it been the buyers rather than the sellers that had become bankrupt, it could not seriously be contended that the buyers would be entitled to remove the wheat from the sellers' store without paying for it. 39 Reid, Property (n 6) para 620 (Gordon). This is the position adopted in the Draft the Lord President appears to consider possession through the employee to be natural rather than civil possession. By allowing delivery to have occurred in this case, the law would be allowing delivery to occur while custody remained with the transferor.
In other words, delivery of goods where custody is retained by an employee of the transferor would be a form of constitutum possessorium, requiring a new basis for the holding. This does not plausibly appear. As was argued for the sellers' trustee in
Broughton v Aitchison, the small amount of the payment "rendered it almost ludicrous to plead upon it". A payment of one shilling is more in the manner of a tip. 47 While there may be some attraction in allowing this as facilitating ease of transfer, it is very difficult to reconcile the outcome in this case with the requirement for delivery. premises, into taking the transferor to be owner: in the same case, it was not found relevant that the goods were kept in a warehouse in which third parties' goods were also stored. In such circumstances, there can be no expectation that ownership and custody will coincide.
Broughton v Aitchison
A further difficulty is the meaning of independence. How independent is independent? Unless there is no relationship at all between the transferor and the custodier, there will never be a case in which the two are completely independent. If I store my goods in your warehouse, there is a relationship between us, based on our contract. Clearly, then, there are degrees of independence. An employee is, it is established, insufficiently independent, whereas there is sufficient independence in the case of a warehouse-keeper who is not employed by the transferor. What is the basis of this distinction, and where is the line to be drawn?
A way forward may be found in the assignation theory of delivery by transfer of civil possession. This is the idea, considered earlier, that what is happening in this form of delivery is that the right to enforce the duties owed by the custodier to the transferor is being assigned to the transferee. Most rights are freely assignable, but not all are. In particular, in the case of goods held by an employee, those duties, and the employer's right to enforce them, arise from the contract of employment. In the common law of employment, an employer's rights cannot be assigned, due to the existence of delectus personae. 58 While an employer may instruct an employee to 56 Reid, Property (n 6) para 620 (Gordon Delectus personae is not easy to define precisely. However, as a bar to assignation, it is "grounded in the debtor's choice of a particular creditor", 59 and arises "when the parties to the contract have selected each other on the basis of personal qualifications or suitability". 60 As we have seen, delectus personae is present in the case of employment contracts. It may also exist in other relationships of similar kind, such as that between partners in a partnership or between a company and its directors. 61 Where a partner or director has custody of goods belonging to the firm or company in relation to his duties as partner or director, arguably intimation to the partner or director would not be sufficient for a valid delivery of the goods. 62 On the other hand, in the standard case of a warehousekeeper storing the goods, it seems improbable that delectus personae would be held to exist. In a typical case, it will be the owner who has approached the warehousekeeper, and the latter will have no reason to reject the business unless unable or unqualified to handle the goods in was made to the fact that the custodiers were a firm of timber measurers, in this case storing the goods on their own premises.
The suggestion, then, is that delivery by transfer of civil possession will not operate in any case where the contractual relationship between transferor and custodier contains an element of delectus personae. This suggestion does, it must be admitted, face the difficulty that it has never been used expressly as a justification in any reported case for the rule requiring independence between transferor and custodier. Instead, the cases talk merely in terms of the independence of the custodier.
However, linking this to the concept of delectus personae does provide a rationale for distinguishing between different types of custodier, and seems to follow from the idea that this form of delivery is based on assignation of the personal right held against the custodier.
(2) Relationship between custodier and transferee 63 Obligations cannot normally be assigned, a point sometimes obscured by talk of assignation of contracts rather than of rights, as Ross Anderson points out (Anderson, Assignation (n 58) paras 2-36 -2-38; see also Nienaber & Gretton (n 59) 806-807). 64 (1904) 7 F 281. 65 The other ground of decision, that the timber measurers were not the custodiers of the goods, is considered above. 66 For how a contract of service is distinguished from a contract for services in the common law, see Things are much less problematic in the case of a relationship between custodier and transferee. It is quite in order to hand over goods to someone acting on the transferee's behalf -or, indeed, to the transferee himself -on a basis other than the transfer of ownership. The subsequent intimation to the custodier is, in effect, a form of traditio brevi manu.
(3) No contractual relationship
The final situation to be considered is that in which there is no contractual relationship between the custodier and either the transferor or the transferee. As we shall see, there
is little or no authority in Scots law directly on this point, which introduces complexity into the question. Consideration of this question is divided here into several parts. The first of these identifies the issue, and the remainder consider whether the issue can be resolved. 68 It is on this basis that a solicitor acting for the acquirer of heritable property may hold the disposition as undelivered until payment has been made. 69 Reid, Property (n 6) para 121. where a car subject to a retention of title was sold by the original purchaser, and then sold on again, the ultimate purchaser held on behalf of either himself or the company who financed the purchase and which, it appears from the facts of the case, was 75 Anderson, Possession (n 3) 168-169.
intended to be owner until it was repaid. In such a case, the custodier cannot be said in any sense to hold on behalf of the owner, and as a result the owner does not possess. How can this claim to recovery be assigned without ownership itself being given up?
The issue turns on the nature of the owner's right to recover the property when it is held by someone else. Unfortunately, the nature of the remedy is not always made
clear. An owner seeking to recover goods will raise an action for delivery, but the written pleadings are likely merely to state the factual basis of the claim without spelling out the legal principles involved, which may be considered sufficiently obvious. 77 The action for delivery may be used also when the claim is based on a personal right. 78 No doubt this does provide valuable procedural flexibility, but it does leave the nature of the rights involved unexamined. confusion between a right to property based on a real right and a right to property based on a personal right, not assisted by the tendency to use the same word, "restitution", both for claims based on the real right of ownership and also for claims based on unjustified enrichment. 79 We are of concerned here only with the former.
Unfortunately, there is little analysis in the Scots literature of the nature of an owner's claim. A detailed investigation of this would be beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, possible to sketch out what is at least arguably the position.
The starting point is still Stair's account. He considers that:
we make not use of the name or nature of Vindication, whereby the proprietor pursues the possessor, or him who, by fraud, ceases to possess, to suffer the proprietor to take possession of his own, or to make up his damage by his fraud. This part of the action is rather personal than real, for reparation of the damage by the fraudulent quitting possession; yea, the conclusion of delivery doth not properly arise from vindication, which concludes no such obligement on the haver, but only to be passive, and not to hinder the proprietor to take possession of his own. 80 Stair appears to be making a distinction here between the real right of ownership and the personal rights that arise from interference with that right. 81 The real right of ownership is in itself essentially passive. As Reid has said, "the obligation correlative to a real right is negative in nature. It is an obligation not to do something", 82 i.e. an obligation not to interfere with the exercise of the real right. This makes sense. A real right imposes a universal obligation on the whole world. When an owner seeks to enforce his or her right, though, enforcement is not against the whole world but against some specific defender in response to something that (it is alleged) the defender has done, whether it is a delictual claim for damage to the property or a claim for recovery of possession of the property. The claim made by the owner is, therefore, a claim against a specific person or some determinate group of persons, which is, of course, the very definition of a personal right. The separation of the real right of ownership from the personal right for its recovery is further demonstrated by the fact that it is not only enforceable against the current possessor. Instead, it continues to be enforceable, as a claim for damages, against one who has given up possession in bad faith. 83 We can, then, distinguish these two rights held by the owner of corporeal moveable property. This is not a matter of purely academic interest. As the Scottish Law Commission has pointed out, there is a possibility that the two rights might be subject to different periods of negative prescription. 84 In fact, matters may go further, with a third right being identifiable. A distinction may be made between the substantive right of ownership on the one hand and, on the other, the procedural right to bring an action to enforce that ownership. It may seem odd to make that distinction. After all, the latter arises from the former. 85 All the same, the idea of such a distinction is no novelty, and is used any time the law recognises that a right exists but puts into place a procedural bar against its enforcement. The result is that the right cannot be enforced (because of the procedural bar). However, if the person obliged by the right complies with it, for example (in the case of ownership) by delivering the property, that person cannot claim the property back (because he or she was in fact obliged to deliver it). The Roman concept of naturalis obligatio gives us an example of this. 86 In modern law, gambling contracts formerly fell into this category. 87 The same is true of any right, the enforcement of which is barred by limitation: this "does not involve the loss of any substantive right but is the procedural barring of an action after the laps of a period during which the law insists that it must, if at all, be brought."
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 the real right of ownership itself;
 a personal right against any specific person interfering with that right; and  the procedural right to enforce the substantive rights arising from ownership.
If the assignation theory of transfer of civil possession is correct then, in cases where there is no contractual relationship between owner and custodier, delivery can only operate if one of these rights can be assigned.
The first of the rights, the real right itself, can be discounted straight away,
even though it appears to provide a basis for delivery in such cases in German law. 89 There is no basis in Scots authority for assignation of the right of ownership itself. 90 In any case, even were it possible in principle, presumably the transferee would need to take possession of the goods in order to complete the assignation. 91 The assignation itself would not, therefore, be sufficient to effect delivery.
Can the procedural right be separately assigned? It appears that the relevant provisions in German law may have been drafted on the assumption that this was possible: they refer to assignation of the Anspruch auf Herausgabe der Sache, or claim to recovery of the thing, the word Anspruch being one that may in different contexts refer to either the substantive right or the procedural right. 92 The modern view, however, is that the procedural right "is an indispensable safeguard of ownership which the owner cannot transfer without simultaneously giving up his right of ownership". 93 The same view would surely be taken in Scots law. In a different context, the Inner House has said that, where a right "is implied in the right of ownership...in principle it cannot be abandoned by an owner in a manner which would bind his successors in title." 94 The same would seem to apply to the right of an owner to recover the property. While, for example, there could be no objection to an owner assigning a delictual claim where the property has been damaged by another's fault, that money claim is capable of existing separately from ownership. The procedural right to assert ownership necessarily implies a right of ownership underlying it. It is difficult to see how one can be alienated separately from the other without breaking up ownership into fractions, with a relative system of ownership where different people were to be recognised as owner depending on who was asking the question. It need hardly be said that this is not Scots law. the defenders for delivery of the goods. After all, the payment by the pursuers to the owners seems to presuppose that the pursuers are to obtain right to the goods, especially as this is followed immediately by the pursuers attempting to recover the goods. Moreover, it is difficult to see any basis on which the pursuers could claim the goods other than a real right in those goods. Against this, though, it must be said that the pursuers did not plead on the basis of ownership, founding rather on the error only, and the court gave little explanation of the basis of its decision beyond the (undoubted) doing of justice between the parties.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It is clearly settled, first, that where goods are in the custody of a third party, delivery may be made by intimation of the transfer to that third party; and, second, that this form of delivery is not permitted unless the third party custodier is independent of the transferor. The basis of these rules is, however, obscure. transferee can begin to possess merely by instructing the custodier to begin to hold for him. Nor is it obvious why this form of delivery should be excluded by particular forms of relationship between transferor and custodier. It has been suggested here that the response to both of these points is to be found in the law of assignation. It has been suggested that this form of delivery operates by means of an assignation in favour of the transferee of the personal right held by the transferor against the custodier. As that personal right is the basis of the transferor's civil possession, when it passes to the transferee possession also passes and, thus, delivery is made. If indeed this form of delivery is based on assignation, it follows from this that it will not be possible where assignation of the transferor's right is excluded by delectus personae.
It is suggested that this is the reason why this form of delivery is excluded where the custodier is an employee of the transferor. It is further suggested that the concept of delectus personae also allows us to set rational limits to the rule requiring that the custodier be independent of the transferor.
The more difficult question is whether this form of delivery can operate when there is no contractual relationship between owner and custodier at all. In the absence of authority on the point, it has not been possible to reach a firm conclusion on that point. It is hoped, though, that there is at least sketched in outline the shape that an argument to that effect would need to take.
